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PROBABLE CAUSE AND THE PROVABLE CASE:
BRIDGING THE ETHICAL GAP THAT EXISTS IN
THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM
Mitchell M. Suliman*
"The virtue of justice consists in moderation, as regulated by wisdom."

Aristotle'

I.

INTRODUCTION

When deciding whether to bring a case to trial or "refer" charges,
probable cause is the only standard that binds the commander or the
"convening authority." This incredibly low standard fuels an
unrestrained system of justice in the military-one in stark contrast to its
civilian counterparts, which require both probable cause and sufficient
admissible evidence to support a conviction. The Military Justice Act of
2016 has implemented specific recommendations of the Military Justice
Review Group ("MJRG") to comport military justice to its federal
counterparts.2 One such recommendation is to provide commanders with
non-binding disposition guidance.3 The Uniform Code of Military
* Major, Judge Advocate, United States Army. Presently assigned as the United States
Army Consolidated Rehearing Center Officer in Charge & Special Victim Prosecutor, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas. LL.M., 2020, The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army,
Charlottesville, Virginia; J.D., 2014, University of California at Davis School of Law, King Hall;
B.S., 2008, United States Military Academy at West Point. Previous assignments include Defense
Counsel, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas, 2017-2019; Trial Counsel, 7th Infantry Division
& 2d Stryker Brigade Combat Team, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, 2016-2017;
Administrative Law Attorney, I Corps, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, 2015-2016;
Military Intelligence Officer and Platoon Leader, Combat Aviation Brigade, 4th Infantry Division,
Fort Hood, Texas, Camp Taji, Iraq, Mazar-e-Sharif and Kunduz, Afghanistan 2008-2011. Member
of the Bar of California. This Article was submitted in partial completion of the Master of Laws
requirements of the 68th Judge Advocate Officer Graduate Course.
1. SAMUEL AUSTIN ALLIBONE, PROSE QUOTATIONS FROM SOCRATES TO MACAULAY 374

(J.B. Lippincott ed. 1903).
2. See MIL. JUST. REV. GRP., REPORT OF THE MILITARY JUSTICE REVIEW GROUP-PART I:
UCMJ RECOMMENDATIONS (2015) [hereinafter MIL. JUST. REV. GRP. REP.] (proposing substantive

additions to the Uniform Code of Military Justice to enhance the purpose of military law).
3. Id. at 25.

187
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Justice ("UCMJ") now implements this non-binding guidance through
4
Appendix 2.1 of the Manual for Courts-Martial ("MCM"). While
helpful, the disposition guidance fails to bridge an important ethical gap
between the military and civilian justice system.
The MCM generally employs probable cause as the standard for
proceeding with a case at most decision points in the military justice
process. The requirement for probable cause is consistent with the first
standard but omits the second significant standard of the American Bar
Association ("ABA") guidelines concerning the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in the charging decision: there must be sufficient admissible
5
evidence to support a conviction. This Article will examine how the
military justice system can bridge this gap by implementing both the
"probable cause" standard and the "sufficient admissible evidence"
standard without sacrificing the indispensable role of the commander in
military justice.
First, this Article examines the problem of sexual assault in the
6
military and the resulting imbalanced system of justice. Second, the
Article discusses the current debate of the commander's role in military
7
justice as a backdrop to this proposal. Next, it will examine how the
military justice process differs from other prosecutorial ethical
standards, such as the ABA, the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), and the
National District Attorneys Association ("NDAA") standards.'
Specifically, the Article will recommend implementing the status quo's
non-binding consideration of having sufficient admissible evidence as a
9
binding principle before a convening authority can refer a case. The
Article will propose modifications to Article 34 of the UCMJ and the
corresponding Rules for Courts-Martial ("RCM") to ensure that both the
"probable cause" standard and the "sufficient admissible evidence"
10
standard be implemented in the military justice system.

4.

See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES app. 2.1 (2019) [hereinafter 2019

MCM].

5. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION pt. 1, § 3-4.3(a) (AM. BAR
ASS'N 2019) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION] ("A prosecutor should

seek or file criminal charges only if the prosecutor reasonably believes that the charges are
supported by probable cause, that admissible evidence will be sufficient to support conviction
beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the decision to charge is in the interests of justice.").
6. See infra Part 1I.
7. See infra Part III.

8. See infra Part IV.
9. 2019 MCM, supra note 4, app. 2.1, para. 2.1(h).
10.

See infra Part V.
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THE PROBLEM: SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY

For over a decade, there has been an increasing awareness of how
the military responds to sexual assault." Arguably, the attention to the
military's response to sexual assault has never been greater, making it a
top priority to military commanders and their respective formations.12
The Department of Defense's ("DOD") Annual Report to Congress
regarding Sexual Assault in the Military estimated a near forty percent
increase of instances of unwanted sexual contact from 2016 to 2018.13
The military created and revamped several programs over the years to
respond to sexual crimes within its ranks.'4 Consequently, and justifiably
so, there has also been increased pressure to prosecute sexual assault
cases within the military.
Since April 2012, the DOD requires at least the 0-6 Special
Court-Martial Convening Authority (Colonel or Navy Captain) to have
initial disposition decision authority for sexual assault crimes.15 Should a
General Court-Martial Convening Authority decide not to refer sexual
assault charges to court-martial, the next superior competent authority
must review the non-referral decision, regardless of the underlying Staff
Judge Advocate ("SJA") advice.16 Furthermore, the Secretary of the

11. See Dave Philipps, 'This Is Unacceptable. 'Military Reports a Surge of Sexual Assaults in
the Ranks, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2019, 9:10 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/02/us/military-

sexual-assault.html.
12.

Pending Legislation Regarding Sexual Assaults in the Military, Address Before the S.

Armed Services Comm., 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of General Raymond T. Odierno, United
States Army Chief of Staff) (transcript available in the United States Senate Committee on Armed
Services Library at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Odiemo_06-04-13.pdf)
("In a video conference with Army commanders on May 17, I told my commanders that combating
sexual assault and sexual harassment within our ranks is now the Army's #1 priority.").
13. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN
THE MILITARY 3 (2018), https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/800-dod-annual-report-on-sexual-

as/d659d6d0126ad2bl9c18/optimized/full.pdf [hereinafter DOD REPORT 2018] ("Using these rates,
the Department estimates 20,500 Service members, representing about 13,000 women and 7,500
men, experienced some kind of contact or penetrative sexual assault in 2018, up from approximately
14,900 in 2016.").
14.

For example, the military created the Special victims' Counsel Program to advocate for

victims' rights and revamped the way the military prosecutes sex crimes, in part, by creating the
special victims' prosecutor role. See Memorandum from Charles N. Pede, U.S. Lieutenant General,

Judge Advoc. Gen., to Judge Advoc. Legal Servs. Pers. (Dec. 1, 2017) (on file with author); Angel
M. Overgaard, Redefining the Narrative: Why Changes to Military Rule of Evidence 513 Require
Courts to Treat the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege as Nearly Absolute, 224 MIL. L. REV. 979,
997-98 (2016); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, INTERIM REGUL. 27-10, LEGAL SERVS.: MILITARY JUST.

para. 17-7 (Jan. 1, 2019) [hereinafter AR 27-10].
15. See MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 306(a) discussion; Memorandum from Sec'y of Def. to
Secretaries of the Mil. Dep'ts et al. (Apr. 20, 2012), https://jpp.whs.mil/Public/docs/03_TopicAreas/09-WithholdingAuthority/20160408/01_SecDefMemoWithholdingAuthority_20120420.

pdf.
16. AR 27-10, supra note 14, para. 5-28(c).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2020

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 8

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

190

[Vol. 49:187

Army must review a non-referral decision if the SJA recommends
referral to court-martial. 17 This mandatory review process effectively
binds the hands of the convening authority and typically leads to the path
of least resistance: refer the case to trial so long as there is probable
18
cause to believe the accused committed the crime.
The results are illustrative of why probable cause should not be the
sole standard for bringing a case to trial in the military. Only
approximately three percent of the total 7,825 sexual assault cases
reported (both restricted and unrestricted) in Fiscal Year 2019,
19
DOD-wide, resulted in a sexual assault conviction. In Fiscal Year
2019, commanders had the legal authority to take some form of
20
disciplinary action for an alleged sexual assault offense in 2,339 cases.
In other words, there was sufficient evidence to substantiate the alleged
21
misconduct and support action by the commander in 2,339 cases. Of
those 2,339 cases, there were 795 cases with a preferral of court-martial
22
charges for at least one sexual assault. Of those 795 cases, there were
only 264 subjects convicted of any charge at trial, with only 138 subjects
23
Even more alarming, over
convicted of a qualifying sex offense.
assault cases actually
sexual
363
one-quarter of the approximately
24
referred to trial last year resulted in a full acquittal. These statistics are
more than just mere numbers and are in stark contrast to the civilian
counterparts.25 On both sides of the aisle-victims and those accused17. Id.
18. Rachel VanLandingham & Geoffrey Corn, Two for One: The Ethical Pursuitof Justice in
the Military, and Battlefield Success, Through Joint Prosecutorial Decisions, 45 Sw. L. REV. 495,

500-02, 512-13 (2016).
19.

U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN

THE MILITARY app. B at 4, 7, 23 (2019), https://media.defense.gov/2020/Apr/30/2002291671/-1/1/1/3_APPENDIXBSTATISTICAL_DATA_ONSEXUALASSAULT.PDF ("DOD uses the
term 'sexual assault' to refer to a range of crimes, including rape, sexual assault, forcible sodomy,

aggravated sexual contact, abusive sexual contact, and attempts to commit these offenses, as defined
by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). For the purpose of data analysis in this report,
DOD organizes analyses by the most serious sexual assault allegation made by a victim or
investigated by a Military Criminal Investigative Organization (MCIO).").
20. Id. at 18.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 23.
23. Id. A qualifying sex offense in this context is one requiring the convicted individual to
register as a sex offender. Id.
24.

Id. In 2018, over one-third of sexual assault cases referred to trial resulted in a full

acquittal. DOD REPORT 2018, supra note 13, at 24.
25. Between 2013 and 2017, the DOJ attained convictions at a rate no less than ninety-three
percent. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., U.S. ATTORNEYS' ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT (2017); U.S.
DEP'T OF JUST., U.S. ATTORNEYS' ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT (2016); U.S. DEP'T OF JUST.,
U.S. ATTORNEYS' ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT (2015); U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., U.S. ATTORNEYS'
ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT (2014); U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., U.S. ATTORNEYS' ANNUAL
STATISTICAL REPORT (2013). Note, however, that this figure is representative of all criminal
convictions-not exclusively sexual offenses. But see BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol49/iss1/8

4

Suliman: Probable Cause and the Provable Case: Bridging the Ethical Gap Th

PROBABLE CAUSE AND THE PROVABLE CASE

2020]

191

interests are at stake. The commander, the person charged with
prosecutorial discretion in the military, makes decisions that have a
profound impact on the victim, the victim's family, the soldier charged,
the accused's family, the unit, and the community as a whole. Such a
matter of significance requires greater scrutiny and attention, presently
unguided by the low probable cause standard.
III.

THE DEBATE: PRESERVING THE ROLE OF THE COMMANDER IN
MILITARY JUSTICE

The military justice system differs from the civilian justice system
in that the military commander, not a prosecutor, makes the final
decision on whether to bring a case or "refer" a case to trial. The
commander's role is critical to the seminal purpose of military justice:
"to promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order and discipline in
the armed forces, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military
establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national security of the
United States." 2 6 Since the foundation of military law in 1775, military
justice and military discipline have always been inseparable and
indispensable at their core. 27 Thus, the need to promote good order and
discipline requires a system of justice that is different from civilian
justice systems. A primary difference is prosecutorial authority.
The commander's prosecutorial authority is unique in nature. The
scope and placement of this unique prosecutorial authority have been a
subject of intense debate over the last decade and remain so today. 28
Recent legislative proposals recommend taking this prosecutorial
authority away from the commander and vesting all prosecutorial
decisions with the military lawyer. 29 Proponents of the modification
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 - STATISTICAL
TABLES, at 24 (2013) (reporting a 68 percent conviction rate for rape in the seventy-five largest
counties in the United States).

26.

2019

MCM,

supra note 4,

app. 2.1

para.

1.1

n.1

(quoting

MANUAL

FOR

COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES pt. I, para. 3 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 MCM]).
27. See COMM. ON THE UNIF. CODE OF MIL. JUST. GOOD ORD. & DISCIPLINE IN THE ARMY,
REP. TO HONORABLE WILBER M. BRUCKER SEC'Y OF THE ARMY
11-12 (1960),

http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/Powell_report/pdf ("In the development of discipline,
correction of individuals is indispensable; in correction, fairness or justice is indispensable. Thus, it
is a mistake to talk of balancing discipline and justice-the two are inseparable. . . .Once a case is
before a court-martial, it should be realized by all concerned that the sole concern is to accomplish
justice under the law. ... It is not proper to say that a military court-martial has a dual function as
an instrument of discipline and as an instrument of justice. It is an instrument of justice and in
fulfilling this function it will promote discipline.").
28. See Philipps, supra note 11.
29. See Military Justice Improvement Act of 2019, S. 1789, 116th Cong. (2019); Military
Justice Improvement Act of 2013, S. 967, 113th Cong. (2013). Senator Kirsten Gillibrand proposed
legislation would vest the judge advocate with referral authority instead of the commander. S. 1789;
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argue that lay commanders should not have such wide and vast
prosecutorial discretion.30 Meanwhile, opponents emphasize that
military justice is a critical tool that the commander must possess to
ensure good order and discipline in his or her formation, a responsibility
that only the commander bears.3 1 Opponents argue that binding legal
advice increases the lawyer's power and effectively strips away the
commander's discretion to instill good order and discipline in his or her
formation. 32 A recent and novel recommendation is for the commander
and the lawyer to share prosecutorial authority. 33 This debate, while
important, is not the focus of this Article, but rather serves as a backdrop
for any proposal to modify the military justice system. The looming
question remains: how will adding an additional and binding standard
affect the commander's prosecutorial discretion?
This proposal fully recognizes that the commander is integral and
primary to military justice decision-making. This proposal also seeks to
implement an ethical standard already practiced by civilian
jurisprudence: before a prosecutor can bring a case forward, there must
be sufficient admissible evidence to sustain a conviction. 34 Critics will
likely argue that any binding legal advice will tie the hands of the
commander and further strip his or her prosecutorial discretion.
However, bridging the ethical divide that exists within the military
justice system will not only seek to increase good order and discipline
but also promote a more fair and robust system of justice while
preserving the commander's vital role.

IV.

THE STATUS QUO: PROBABLE CAUSE AND NON-BINDING
DISPOSITION GUIDANCE

In order to bridge the ethical gap, it is important to understand the
ethical standard currently required to bring a case forward. Currently,

S. 967. The most recent introduction of MJIA of 2019 would vest this authority in judge advocates
with the rank of 0-6 or higher who possess significant criminal justice experience. S. 1789.
30. See, e.g., Philipps, supra note 11 (discussing the impact of commanders' discretion in
sexual assault cases).
31.

Rachel E. VanLandingham, Acoustic Separation in Military Justice: Filling the Decision

Rule Vacuum with Ethical Standards, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 389, 399-401 (2014) (citing James B.
Roan & Cynthia Buxton, The American Military Justice System in the New Millennium, 52 A.F. L.

REV. 185, 186 (2002) ("The maintenance of good order and discipline is an absolutely essential
function of command.")).

32. See id. at 424 n.206 (noting that proposed legislation would likely strip the commander of
prosecutorial discretion).
33. VanLandingham & Con, supra note 18, at 508-10.
34. See infra Part IV.B (comparing the most significant ethical standards of prosecution in the
civilian justice system).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol49/iss1/8
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commanders are required to seek legal counsel from their lawyer before
referring charges to a general or special court-martial, while pre-trial
advice need only be prepared for any charge referred to a general
court-martial.3 5 This "pre-trial advice" requires that the convening
authority's senior military lawyer or SJA make written conclusions as to
(1) whether each specification alleges an offense; (2) whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused committed the charged
offense; and (3) whether a court-martial would have jurisdiction over the
accused. 36 The SJA is also required to provide a non-binding
recommendation as to the disposition of the case "in the interest of
justice and discipline." 37 The convening authority cannot refer charges to
court-martial if the SJA determines that probable cause is lacking. 38
RCM 601(d)(1) makes clear that one can use inadmissible evidence and
hearsay "in whole or in part" when determining this probable cause
finding. 3 9 Thus, this probable cause determination serves as the only
limit to a commander's decision to refer a case to court-martial. 40 This
begs the question: what is probable cause?
A.

Probable Cause

Probable cause is a constitutional term, originating in the Fourth
Amendment. The Fourth Amendment aims to protect individuals from
unreasonable searches and seizures.4 1 Yet, this constitutional search and
seizure standard is now used to bring a servicemember to trial. 42
Probable cause is the standard for proceeding with a case at most
decision points in the military justice system including warrants,
apprehension, pre-trial confinement and restraint, and most relevant to
this discussion-referral. Probable cause simply constitutes a reasonable
35. This is a new change from Military Justice Act of 2016. Previously, the convening
authority was only required to seek legal advice from its judge advocate prior to referring charges to
a general court-martial. See 2016 MCM, supra note 26, R.C.M. 406(a). Now, "[a] convening
authority is required to consult with a judge advocate before referring charges to a special
court-martial (see RCM 406A) and may seek advice of a lawyer before referring charges to a
summary court-martial." 2019 MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 406(a) discussion.
36. See UCMJ art. 34(a)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 834.
37. Id. art. 34(a)(2), § 834(a)(2); see also infra Section Iv.C.2 for a discussion on the new
UCMJ article 33.
38. See art. 34(a)(1)(B), § 834(a)(1)(B).
39. 2019 MCM, supra note 15, R.C.M. 601(d)(1).
40. vanLandingham & Corn, supra note 18, at 502.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (emphasis added)).
42. MIL. JUST. REV. GRP. REP., supra note 2, at 335. Whether the framers of the Constitution
intended for this current paradigm is another question and not addressed here.
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belief that the accused committed an offense.4 3 In Brinegar v. United
States, the United States Supreme Court first defined probable cause as
"'the facts and circumstances . . . of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being
committed."" This reasonable belief standard is the baseline
requirement in both military and civilian justice systems.
Legally, in the United States, all that is required to bring a case to
trial is probable cause. According to the Supreme Court, "[s]o long as
the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed
an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute,
and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury generally rests
entirely in his discretion." 45 When a commander is deciding whether to
refer charges to a court-martial, the legal and ethical standard of
probable cause is the only standard binding the commander.
Perplexingly, a reasonable belief is all that is required to bring a case to
trial, yet proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required for a conviction at
trial. Most ethical standards governing criminal justice address this wide
gap. 46 Military justice, governed by the UCMJ, remains the outlier.

B.

An Ethical ProcessDifferentfrom Others: Military Justice

Before 1920, military commanders were virtually unbound in their
discretion to dispose of charges against an accused. The only
requirement was an investigation and an "indorsement whether or not, in
his opinion, the charges can be sustained." 47 The 1920 Articles of War
contained the first requirement for the commander to seek legal advice
prior to referring charges to court-martial. 48 Originally, this was merely a
43. The current 2019 edition of the MCM does not define the term "probable cause." See
2019 MCM, supranote 4, R.C.M. 601(d)(1) (outlining the only standard for referral of charges to a
court-martial: "If the convening authority finds or is advised by a judge advocate that there is
probable cause to believe that an offense triable by a court-martial has been committed and that the
accused committed it, and that the specification alleges an offense, the convening authority may
refer it."). However, previous editions have defined it in terms of referral and pretrial advice. Cf
2016 MCM, supra note 26, R.C.M. 406(b) discussion (requiring the standard known as probable
cause).
44. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (citing Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
45. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
46. See infra Part V.B (discussing counterarguments and anticipated criticisms to closing this
ethical gap).
47. MIL. JUST. REV. GRP. REP., supra note 2, at 335 (citing MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL,
UNITED STATES 19 (1905)).
48. Id. at 334-35 (citing Articles of War of 1920, art. 70, para. 3) ("Before directing the trial
of any charge by general court-martial the appointing authority will refer it to his staff judge

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol49/iss1/8
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procedural safeguard and not binding on the commander. 49 Probable
cause first became a legal standard for referral when the UCMJ was
originally enacted in 1950.50 Congress prescribed that convening
authorities must determine whether probable cause supports a charge
prior to referring the charge to court-martial.51 It was not until 1983 that
Congress transferred the probable cause standard of Article 34 from the
commander to his or her lawyer. 2 This was the first instance in which
the lawyer's advice bound the commander's decision-making.
This low threshold of probable cause has drawn much criticism
from courts and legal scholars alike. 53 The critiques spurred several
jurisdictions to heighten the ethical standard required to prosecute a
case, leading to a divide between military practice and civilian practice
with respect to the principles used when deciding whether to bring
charges to trial.5 4 In civilian practice, probable cause is only part of the
ethical equation to bring a case forward. A more robust system of
standards guides civilian attorneys and assists with the exercise of their
prosecutorial discretion. Common to all is the additional requirement to
have sufficient admissible evidence to sustain a conviction. The ABA
Standards are the predominant guidelines, which guide all attorneys on
the ethical practice of law.

1. The ABA's Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution
Function
The ABA prescribes standard ethical guidelines for those who
practice law, including federal prosecutors, state prosecutors, and
military legal practitioners. In fact, the services' specific professional
responsibility rules take after this core-guiding document for ethical
practice.55 Recently, the ABA updated its rules pertaining to
advocate for consideration and advice.").

49. Id. at 335. The commander could still refer the case even if the Staff Judge Advocate
determined that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 335-36 n.4 (citing Act of May 5, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-506, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 108).
52. Id. at 335-36 n.5 (citing Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209, § 4(a)(2), 97
Stat. 1393, 1395).
53.

See Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession'sFailure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors,

36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 284-85, 290-91 (2008) (arguing that a standard closer to beyond a
reasonable doubt should be used by prosecutors in lieu of the inappropriately low standard of
probable cause).
54. See id.; infra Part IV.B.1-3.
55.

See U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REGUL. 27-26, LEGAL SERVS.: RULES PRO. CONDUCT FOR

LAWYERS para. 7(b) (June 28, 2018) [hereinafter AR 27-26] ("These Army Rules of Professional
Conduct for Lawyers are adapted directly from the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, with important contributions from the Navy Rules of Professional Conduct
and the Air Force Rules of Professional Conduct.").
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prosecutorial charging decisions. In relevant part, the ABA prescribes
that "[a] prosecutor should seek or file criminal charges only if the
prosecutor reasonably believes that the charges are supported by
probable cause, that admissible evidence will be sufficient to support
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the decision to charge is
in the interests of justice."5 6
The ABA requires all prosecutors to engage in this quantum of
evidence calculus before bringing a case forward. While this is the
predominant standard for prosecutors to follow, the military rules have
not adopted this ethical standard in practice. On the contrary, the DOJ
adopted the ABA Standard for all United States Attorneys to follow. 57

2. The DOJ's Principles of Federal Prosecution
The United States Attorneys' manual, in its Principles of Federal
Prosecution, prescribes the basic requirement of probable cause in order
to initiate prosecution. 58 However, the comment to Rule 9-27.200
explains that the probable cause requirement is the "minimal
requirement" and a "threshold consideration only." 59 The United States
Attorneys' Manual Rule 9-27.220 prescribes additional guidelines for
federal civilian prosecutors in their exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
In relevant part, the DOJ prescribes the following:
The attorney for the government should commence or recommend
federal prosecution if he/she believes that the person's conduct
constitutes a federal offense and that the admissible evidence will
probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction, unless (1) the
prosecution would serve no substantial federal interest; (2) the person
is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction; or (3) there
exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution. 60

Moreover, the comment to the Rule provides that:
[B]oth as a matter of fundamental fairness and in the interest of the
efficient administration of justice, no prosecution should be initiated
against any person unless the attorney for the government believes that

§ 3-4.3(a).
§ 9-27.200 (2018).

56.

ABA STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 5,

57.
58.
59.
60.

U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., U.S. ATT'Ys' MANUAL
Id.
Id. § 9-27.200 cmt.
Id. § 9-27.220 (emphasis added).
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the admissible evidence is sufficient to obtain and sustain a guilty
verdict by an unbiased trier of fact. 61

In addition to this baseline-charging rule, the DOJ provides specific and
structured guidance on several other matters affecting prosecutorial
decisions including plea agreements, alternative dispositions, and
non-criminal alternatives. 62 While the military recently attempted to
provide disposition guidance with the Military Justice Act of 2016, it
failed to incorporate the second ethical standard of having sufficient
admissible evidence to sustain a conviction. The prosecution guidelines
for all district attorneys are also contrary to military practice.

3. The NDAA National Prosecution Standards
The NDAA is the oldest and largest nonpartisan national
organization that provides resources and training to prosecutors across
the United States.63 The NDAA, often regarded as the foremost source of
expertise on the prosecution function, provides nationwide standards,
resources, training, and assistance to prosecutors." The NDAA's
National Prosecution Standards, in relevant part, prescribe that "[a]
prosecutor should file charges that he or she believes adequately
encompass the accused's criminal activity and which he or she
reasonably believes can be substantiated by admissible evidence at
trial." 65 The NDAA also dictates that "[t]he prosecutor should only file
those charges that are consistent with the interests of justice" and lists
several factors relevant to this decision including the probability of
conviction. 66 The NDAA makes clear that prosecutors must apply a
higher standard than mere probable cause when deciding to charge. The
relevant commentary follows:
While commencing a prosecution is permitted by most ethical
standards upon a determination that probable cause exists to believe
that a crime has been committed and that the defendant has committed
it, the standard prescribes a higher standard for filing a criminal
charge. To suggest that the charging standard should be the
prosecutor's reasonable belief that the charges can be substantiated by
admissible evidence at trial is recognition of the powerful effects of the

§ 9-27.200

61.

Id.

62.

MIL. JUST. REv. GRP. REP., supra note 2, at 337.

cmt.

63. About NDAA, NAT'L DIST. ATT'YS ASS'N, https://ndaa.org/about/aboutndaa (last visited
Nov. 7, 2020).
64. Id.
65. NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 4-2.2 (NAT'L DIST. ATT'YS Ass'N, 3d ed. 2009).
66. Id. § 4-2.4.
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initiation of criminal charges. Pursuant to the prosecution's duty to
seek justice, the protection of the rights of all (even the prospective
defendant) is required. 67

The leading national organization on the prosecutor function
recognizes that the threshold standard of probable cause is too low to
check prosecutors' massive discretion in charging. While there may be
guidance on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the military, this
recent guidance is non-binding in nature. 68 Unlike its civilian
counterparts, the military commander's prosecutorial function is
currently unchecked, legally bound only by the low probable cause
standard.

4. Military Rules of Professional Responsibility
Common to all ethical standard-bearers in the civilian system is this
concept of sufficient admissible evidence to sustain a conviction. The
civilian system attempts to fill the gap between the standard of "probable
cause" and the standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" for conviction
with this critical standard. No such gap-filler exists in the military. Yet,
military appellate courts have applied this higher ethical standard in
courts-martial and even cited to the ABA Standards when examining
69
actions by a trial counsel in the prosecution of criminal cases. In
United States v. Howe, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military
Review distinguished between the referral standard and the ethical
standard required to proceed to trial. 70 The Howe court held that, in
accordance with RCM 601, the convening authority can refer a case
based solely on the standard of probable cause and that "the decision to
prosecute may be premised on evidence which is incompetent,
inadmissible, or even tainted by illegality." 7 1 The court presumed good
faith when examining the commander's decision to refer based on
72
probable cause and refused to inquire further into the decision-making.
The Howe court distinguishes this referral standard from what trial
counsel must have to continue to trial. In doing so, the Court of Military
Review applied the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice to the
Government's prosecutorial actions in the case holding that "[t]he
67. Id. § 4-2 cmt.
68. See infra Part IV.C.2 (discussing the recent non-binding guidance contained in Article 33,
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 833 and 2019 MCM, supra note 4, app. 2.1).
69. See United States v. Howe, 37 M.J. 1062, 1064 (N.M.C.M.R. 1993); United States v.
Dancy, 38 M.J. 1, 5 (C.M.A. 1993); United States v. Hamilton, 41 M.J. 22, 26 (C.M.A. 1994);
United States v. Meek, 44 M.J. 1, 5-6 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
70. Howe, 37 M.J. at 1064.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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Government's prosecutorial duty requires that it not 'permit the
continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient
evidence to support a conviction.' ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice
(1986), Standard 3.8(a)."7 3 Accordingly, the "trial counsel had an ethical
obligation to recommend that any charge or specification not warranted
by the evidence be withdrawn."7 4 Clearly, military appellate courts have
applied the same ethical standards guiding civilian practice to military
prosecutors.
Since the appellate courts have applied this higher ethical standard
to military prosecutors, one would expect the military-specific rules of
professional responsibility to follow suit. However, both the Army and
Navy standards of professional responsibility require only that the trial
counsel recommend to the convening authority to withdraw any charge
or specification not supported by probable cause. 75 The corresponding
comments explain, "[t]rial counsel may have the duty, in certain
circumstances, to bring to the court's attention any charge that lacks
sufficient evidence to support a conviction." 76 However, the rules do not
explain what these "certain circumstances" are, nor do they heighten the
ethical standard as stipulated by the ABA rules, by the DOJ rules, and by
certain military appellate courts. Despite attempts by the military courts
and the service-specific professional responsibility rules to address the
ethical divide, the gap remains today in both the Army and the Navy.
Interestingly, not all services follow suit. The Air Force rules come the
closest to addressing this ethical divide.
The rules guiding ethical practice for Air Force judge advocates
require both an evaluation of both probable cause and whether there is
sufficient admissible evidence to sustain a conviction.7 7 The discussion
to this rule makes clear that "[t]rial counsel must inform the SJA for the
convening authority immediately upon discovering that there is
insufficient evidence to support a conviction of any charge." 78 Although
the Air Force is the only service department to address the ethical
concern of having sufficient admissible evidence to sustain a conviction,
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See AR 27-26, supra note 55, app. B, r. 3.8(a); U.S. DEP'T OF NAVY, JUDGE ADVOC. GEN.
INSTRUCTION 5803.1E, PRO CONDUCT ATT'YS PRACTICING UNDER THE COGNIZANCE AND
SUPERVISION OF THE JUDGE ADVOC. GEN. (Jan. 20, 2015) encl. 1, r. 3.8(a)

76. See AR 27-26, supra note 55, app. B, r. 3.8(a) cmt. 1 (citing United States v. Howe, 37
M.J. 1062 (N.M.C.M.R. 1993)).
77. U.S. DEP'T OF AIR FORCE, INSTRUCTION 51-110, PRO RESP. PROGRAM para. 3-3.9 (Dec.
11, 2018) ("It is unprofessional conduct for a trial counsel to institute, or cause to be instituted, or to

permit the continued pendency of criminal charges when it is known that the charges are not
supported by probable cause. A trial counsel should not institute or permit the continued pendency
of criminal charges in the absence of admissible evidence to support a conviction.").

78.

Id. para. 3-3.9 discussion.
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the corresponding rules within the MCM do not. In essence, the rules for
referral and the ethical guidelines for Air Force judge advocates are at
odds with the UCMJ and impose a tougher standard for the legal
practitioner as opposed to the commander. This quandary, in some
respects, worsens the ethical gap and creates conflicting guidance on
what is required to refer a case to trial. Congress attempted to fix this
ethical concern with the implementation of the Military Justice Act of

2016.79
C.

The Attempted Fix: Non-Binding Disposition Guidance

1. The Old: The Discussion to RCM 306(b)
The commander has always been responsible for disposing of
charges within his or her command, an arduous responsibility. 80 The
implementation of the original UCMJ in 1950 first codified this lofty
command responsibility, requiring convening authorities to dispose of
charges "in the interest of justice and discipline."8 1 In 1984, President
Reagan first set forth RCM 306, which provides an express policy for
the disposition of offenses by the commander. 82 Prior to the Military
Justice Act of 2016, the discussion to RCM 306(b) provided a
non-exclusive list of disposition factors for the commander to consider
when deciding how to dispose of offenses. 83 The previous law included
the following disposition factors:
[T]he nature of and circumstances surrounding the offense and the
extent of the harm caused by the offense, including the offense's effect
on morale, health, safety, welfare, and discipline; when applicable, the
views of the victim as to disposition; existence of jurisdiction over the
accused and the offense; availability and admissibility of evidence; the
willingness of the victim or others to testify; cooperation of the
accused in the apprehension or prosecution of another accused;
possible improper motives or biases of the person(s) making the
79. Compare id. para. 3-3.9, with UCMJ art. 34, 10 U.S.C. § 834. The Military Justice Act of
2016 was signed into law as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017.
See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, S. 2943, 114th Cong. § 5205 (2016)
(enacted).

80. See 2019 MCM, supra note 4, R.C.M. 306(b); MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED
STATES, R.C.M. 306(b) discussion (2012) ("The disposition decision is one of the most important
and difficult decisions facing a commander.").
81. UCMJ art. 30, 10 U.S.C. § 830.
82. Exec. Order No. 12473, 49 Fed. Reg. 28825 (July 13, 1984); MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 306 (1984).
83. 2016 MCM, supra note 26, R.C.M. 306(b) discussion.
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allegation(s); availability and likelihood of prosecution of the same or
similar and related charges against the accused by another jurisdiction;
appropriateness of the authorized punishment to the particular accused
or offense. 84

The factors listed above were largely based on the 1979 version of
the ABA Standards for Prosecution Function but purposefully omitted
the evaluation of "sufficient admissible evidence to sustain a conviction"
standard that guides civilian charging decisions. 85 In fact, the drafters of
the previous non-binding discussion section of RCM 306(b) selected a
few of the ABA Standards and purposefully omitted important others. 86
The drafters explained particular omitted factors as being "inconsistent"
with the commander's judicial function.8 7 This dispositional guidance,
albeit non-binding, was previously buried in the discussion section of the
rule and was criticized as "lack[ing] explanation, comment, context and
clarity."88 This lack of clarity and structure spurred changes in the
Military Justice Act of 2016.

2. The New: UCMJ Article 33 and Appendix 2.1 to the MCM
The MJRG, which reviewed the UCMJ in its entirety for Congress,
recognized that the disposition decision-making guidance under Article
30 and RCM 306(b) was unstructured and differed significantly from
civilian practice. 89 The MJRG proposed changes to align military
practice to civilian practice. 90 Congress adopted the MJRG's
recommendations and created a new statutory provision to establish
non-binding guidance for commanders, convening authorities, staff
judge advocates, and judge advocates to consider when exercising their
respective military justice duties. To do this, Congress completely
revised Article 33, which formerly pertained to the forwarding of
charges. The new Article 33, as implemented by the Military Justice Act
of 2016, established non-binding guidance that key military justice
players should take into account and further prescribed that this
non-binding guidance incorporate the principles guiding federal civilian
practice. 91 Congress, when drafting this law, sought to modify current
84. Id.
85. MIL. JUST. REV. GRP. REP., supra note 2, at 295-96 n.25.
86. VanLandingham & Corn, supra note 18, at 519.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. MIL. JUST. REV. GRP. REP., supra note 2, at 297-98.
90. Id. at 300-01.
91. UCMJ art. 33, 10 U.S.C. § 833 ("Such guidance shall take into account, with appropriate
consideration of military requirements, the principles contained in official guidance of the Attorney
General to attorneys for the Government with respect to disposition of Federal criminal cases in
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military charging practice to comport with the standards and principles
applicable in most civilian jurisdictions. 92 Accordingly, the DOD
implemented Article 33 by including the disposition guidance in the
MCM as Appendix 2.1.
Appendix 2.1 provides guidance and supports the exercise of
discretion with respect to (1) initiating and declining UCMJ action, (2)
selecting appropriate charges, (3) selecting the appropriate level of
court-martial or alternative disposition, and (4) considering plea
agreements. 93 Paragraph 2.1 of Appendix 2.1 provides fourteen different
factors that the commander or convening authority, in consultation with
a judge advocate, should consider in all cases. 94 These factors define
what the commander should consider in the "interests of justice and
good order and discipline" as required by Article 30 of the UCMJ.
Buried in this fourteen-factor list is the eighth factor: "Whether
admissible evidence will likely be sufficient to obtain and sustain a
conviction in a trial by court-martial." 95 While this disposition guidance
is helpful, it falls short of bridging the gap between the probable cause
standard and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. This guidance,
created to comport with the civilian justice system, includes this
heightened standard solely as a non-binding consideration. 96 Moreover,
the guidance only replicates the previous standard of probable cause as
the sole referral standard in Appendix 2. .97 Thus, the deliberate problem
still exists in the military justice system: probable cause, without more,
is the only binding standard necessary to bring a case to trial.

accordance with the principle of fair and evenhanded administration of Federal criminal law.").

92. See 2019 MCM, supra note 4, app. 2.1 analysis at A2.1-4 ("The disposition factors
contained in this appendix are adapted primarily from three sources: the Principles of Federal
Prosecution issued by the Department of Justice; the American Bar Association (ABA), Criminal
Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function; and the National District Attorneys Association
(NDAA), National Prosecution Standards. Practitioners are encouraged to familiarize themselves
with the disposition factors contained in this appendix as well as these related civilian prosecution
function standards. The disposition factors have been adapted with a view toward the unique nature
of military justice and the need for commanders and convening authorities to exercise wide
discretion to meet their responsibilities to maintain good order and discipline.").

93. Id. § 1, para. 1.2.
94. Id. §2, para. 2.1.
95. Id. §2, para. 2.1(h).
96. Id. §§ 1-2, paras. 1.1-1.2.
97. Id. § 2, para. 2.3 ("Referral. Probable cause must exist for each charge and specification
referred to a court-martial. However, when making a referral decision, the convening authority
should also consider the matters described in paragraph 2.1 of this appendix.").
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THE SOLUTION: THE PROVABLE CASE

A Necessary Change: Sufficient Admissible Evidence to Sustain a
Conviction

Moving from a mere probable cause standard to more of a provable
case standard is not a revolutionary idea. On the contrary, during the
congressional hearings on the first proposed UCMJ in 1949, there was a
proposal that the "standard for referral of charges to general
court-martial should be raised to 'beyond a reasonable doubt."' 98 This
proposal attempts to comport the military justice system to the
applicable civilian felony charging standards of the time. However, the
committee did not adopt the proposal. 99 The status quo necessitates
closing the divide between probable cause and beyond a reasonable
doubt in the military justice system.
A commander, guided by his or her judge advocate, ought to have
sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction when referring
charges to court-martial. A commander's discretion to charge is an
enormous exercise of power, and it should be checked by something
greater than mere probable cause. The standard of having sufficient
admissible evidence to sustain a conviction requires the commander and
the judge advocate to evaluate the quality and sufficiency of the
evidence in a case before referral, hardly a practice to be discouraged.
An evaluation of the strength or sufficiency of evidence needed to
establish proof is a necessary practice when proceeding to trial anyway.
Doing so in preparation for trial, post-referral, is a backwards practice
and one that may encourage bringing cases to trial prematurely.
B.

Anticipated Criticism

Critics will argue that imposing this standard on the commander
will necessarily limit his or her ability to maintain good order and
discipline in the formation because the change would give the lawyer
greater binding power while giving the commander less. Presently,
commanders are required to receive binding legal advice regarding the
probable cause determination from their judge advocate. 100 A probable
cause determination, assisted by the Article 32 process, is necessarily a
98. MIL. JUST. REV. GRP. REP., supra note 2, at 336 n.4 (quoting Colonel Melvin Maas,
Uniform Code of Military Justice: Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before Subcomm. of the Comm. On
Armed Servs., 81st Cong. 712 (1949)).
99. Id.
100. UCMJ art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832; THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S LEGAL CENTER AND
SCHOOL, COMMANDER'S LEGAL HANDBOOK 3 (2019).
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legal function. Similarly, an evaluation as to the sufficiency of the
evidence is also a legal function best completed by the judge advocate.
A judge advocate is best suited to determine what evidence is likely
admissible at trial and the quality and quantity of evidence needed to
obtain and sustain a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.
Simply said, commanders, who lack formal legal education and training,
are not suited to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence.
Another criticism is that judge advocates often do not know what
will be admissible pre-referral. In most cases, admissibility
determinations of key evidence occur well after referral, during motions
litigation. In many cases, motions hearings do not occur until days
before trial. Critics will likely argue that any binding advice based on the
sufficiency of admissible evidence would not only be premature but also
inaccurate. Either way, this legal function would not drastically alter the
current discretion maintained by the commander. If both probable cause
and sufficient admissible evidence exist, as determined by the
commander's lawyer, the commander still maintains the same discretion
to dispose of the case "in the interest of justice and discipline." The
commander can still decide to not refer the case and pursue alternative
dispositions. If the commander is advised that either probable cause or
the sufficiency of evidence is lacking, the commander would be
prohibited from referring the case. This increased standard would better
inform the commander's decision-making in bringing the case forward.
At the end of the day, it would lead to a more informed and wiser
exercise of his or her command discretion regarding military justiceone that will likely promote a healthier and more robust maintenance of
good order and discipline in his or her formation. A fairer system,
legally bound by common ethical standards, would lead to greater
confidence and belief in the military justice system.
Opponents could argue that this change would likely create issues
on appeal, where appellate courts would now have to determine and
scrutinize the judge advocate and commander's knowledge at the time of
referral. Presently, the non-binding disposition guidance in Appendix 2.1
is non-litigable.1 01 While it may be difficult to predict future appellate
issues and the courts' handling of those issues, it is telling what the
courts have done with the current binding threshold of probable cause.
The current decision to refer, based on probable cause, must be and is
10 2
Courts have refused to inquire
presumed to be made in good faith.

101. 2019 MCM, supra note 4, app. 2.1, § 1, para. 1.4 ("This Appendix is not intended to, does
not, and may not be relied upon to create a right, benefit, or defense, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law or in equity by any person.").
102. United States v. Hardin, 7 M.J. 399, 404 (C.M.A. 1979).
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further once the referral decision has been made.1 03 Although time would
tell, the courts may presume good faith and be hesitant to review referral
decisions based on both probable cause and sufficient admissible
evidence to sustain a conviction. Certain recommendations would enable
commanders, legal practitioners, and courts alike to comport the
military's ethical standards to those of its civilian counterparts.

C. Recommendations
In an attempt to fix the ethical gap that exists within the military
justice system, the proposed legislation that would effectuate this change
in the MCM follows.104
1. Legislative Proposal: UCMJ Article 34
Section 834 of Title 10, United States Code (Article 34 of the
UCMJ) is amended to read as follows:
§ 834. Art. 34. Advice to convening authority before referral for trial

(a) GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL.(1) STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE ADVICE REQUIRED BEFORE
REFERRAL.- Before referral of charges and specifications to a
general court-martial for trial, the convening authority shall submit the
matter to the staff judge advocate for advice, which the staff judge
advocate shall provide to the convening authority in writing. The
convening authority may not refer a specification under a charge to a
general court-martial unless the staff judge advocate advises the
convening authority in writing that(A) the specification alleges an offense under this chapter;
(B) there is probable cause to believe that the accused
committed the offense charged;
(C) there is sufficient admissible evidence to obtain and sustain a
conviction in a trialby court-martial;and
(D) a court-martial would have jurisdiction over the accused and the
offense.

103. United States v. Howe, 37 M.J. 1062, 1064 (N.M.C.M.R. 1993).
104. While these recommendations solely pertain to the proposed legislative changes within
the MCM, the author also recommends all Services modify their respective professional
responsibility rules and standards pertaining to prosecutorial ethics to comport to its civilian justice
counterparts and the ABA guidelines. See supra Part IV.B.
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2. Legislative Proposal: RCM 406(b)(2)
RCM 406(b)(2) is amended to read as follows:
(2) Conclusion with respect to whether there is sufficient admissible
evidence to obtain and sustain a conviction on the offense charged in
the specification.

3. Legislative Proposal: RCM 601(d)(1)
RCM 601(d)(1) (Basisfor referral) is amended to read as follows:
(1) Basis for referral. If the convening authority finds or is advised by
a judge advocate that there is probable cause to believe that an offense
triable by a court-martial has been committed, that the accused
committed it, that the specification alleges an offense, and that there is
sufficient admissible evidence to obtain and sustain a conviction in a
trial by court-martial, the convening authority may refer it. The
convening authority or judge advocate may consider information from
any source and shall not be limited to information reviewed by any
previous authority, but a case may not be referred to a general or
special court-martial except in compliance with paragraph (d)(2) or
(d)(3) of this rule. The convening authority or judge advocate shall not
be required before charges are referred to resolve legal issues,
including objections to evidence, which may arise at trial, but must
consider whether there is sufficient admissible evidence to obtain and
sustain a conviction at trial.

4. Legislative Proposal: MCM Appendix 2.1, Paragraph 2.3
Paragraph 2.3. of Appendix 2.1, MCM is amended to read as
follows:
2.3. Referral. Probable cause and sufficient admissible evidence to
obtain and sustain a conviction must exist for each charge and
specification referred to a court-martial. However, when making a
referral decision, the convening authority should also consider the
matters described in Paragraph 2.1 of this Appendix.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Bridging the gap between probable cause and beyond a reasonable
doubt before bringing a case to trial is a necessary change in military
justice. A binding standard, requiring judge advocates and commanders
to consider whether there is sufficient admissible evidence to sustain a
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conviction, would lead to a more restrained exercise of the commander's
prosecutorial discretion. While there may be criticisms to making the
current non-binding consideration a binding principle, this change would
encourage a better system of justice within the military. This necessary
change would comport military justice to its civilian counterparts,
bolster the credibility of the military justice system, and preserve the
commander's primary role of maintaining good order and discipline in
the formation.
VII.

ADDENDUM

On October 19, 2020, the Defense Advisory Committee on
Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed
Forces ("DAC-IPAD") published its report on investigative case file
reviews for military adult penetrative sexual offense cases closed in
fiscal year 2017.105 The DAC-IPAD's mission, as directed by Congress,
"is to advise the Secretary of Defense on the investigation, prosecution,
and defense" of allegations of sexual crimes involving members of the
armed forces. 106 The DAC-IPAD conducted a three-year project
examining the 1904 criminal investigative cases and any related
courts-martial cases concerning adult penetrative sexual offenses closed
between October 1, 2016, and September 30, 2017.107 The committee
made two key findings:
There is not a systemic problem with the initial disposition authority's
decision either to prefer a penetrative sexual offense charge or to take
no action against the subject for that offense. In 94.0% and 98.5% of
cases reviewed, respectively, those decisions were reasonable.
There is a systemic problem with the referral of penetrative sexual
offense charges to trial by general court-martial when there is not
sufficient admissible evidence to obtain and sustain a conviction on the
105. The DAC-IPAD report was released while this Article was slated for publication. Readers
of this Article are encouraged to consult this important study. while this Article reaches its
conclusion and recommended legislative proposals with a focus on professional responsibility and
ethical standards, the DAC-IPAD study reaches similar recommendations after performing in-depth
quantitative and qualitative case reviews of all adult penetrative sexual offenses in the military
during Fiscal Year 2017. See DEF. ADVISORY COMM. ON INVESTIGATION, PROSECUTION, AND DEF.
OF SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE ARMED FORCES, REPORT ON INVESTIGATIVE CASE FILE REVIEWS FOR
MILITARY ADULT PENETRATIVE SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES CLOSED IN FISCAL YEAR 2017 (2020),

https://dacipad.whs.mil/images/Public/08-Reports/08_DACIPAD_CaseReview_Report_20201019_
Final_Web.pdf [hereinafter DAC-IPAD REPORT].
106.

Id. at 1 & n.I (citing Carl Levin & Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, § 546, 128 Stat. 3292 (2014)); see
also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 535, 133 Stat.
1198, 1362 (2019) (extending the DAC-IPAD's term from five to ten years).
107. DAC-IPAD REPORT, supra note 105, at 1.
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charged offense. In 31.1% of cases reviewed that were tried to verdict
on a penetrative sexual offense charge, the evidence in the materials
108
reviewed did not meet that threshold.

The DAC-IPAD's findings clearly demonstrate the existing ethical
gap between probable cause and sufficient admissible evidence to
sustain a conviction. The committee determined that there was
insufficient admissible evidence to obtain and sustain a conviction in
213 of the 517 preferred cases.109 In other words, there was insufficient
evidence to sustain a conviction in over forty percent of the preferred
cases.' 1 0 This number is both alarming and concerning, considering the
accused servicemembers had to face the negative impacts associated
with the preferred felonious charges when the Government did not even
have sufficient admissible evidence to sustain a conviction at trial."'
Moreover, of the 235 penetrative sexual offense cases referred and tried
at a general court-martial in fiscal year 2017, seventy-three did not
contain sufficient admissible evidence to convict the accused of the
sexual offense." 2 As expected, all but two of those seventy-three cases
3
resulted in acquittals of the accused on those specific offenses." In one
of the two cases that resulted in a conviction, the conviction was later
4
overturned on appeal due to the factual insufficiency of the evidence."
In contrast, the DAC-IPAD determined that the reviewed material
"contained sufficient admissible evidence to obtain and sustain a
conviction" in 68.9% (162 of 235) of the referred cases tried to
verdict." 5 Of those cases with sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction,
"the government obtained a conviction on the penetrative sexual offense
charge in 54.9% (89 of 162)" cases." 6 The results highlight the
significant difference between the minimal evidentiary threshold of
"probable cause" and the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard at trial.
More importantly, the results support the demand for a mandatory
review of the sufficiency of the evidence before sending a case to trialone which would be binding on the convening authority.

108. See id. at 3 & nn.9-11.
109. Id. at 54.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 55, n.124 (reporting that accused servicemembers facing court-martial are among
the highest suicide risks.); see also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972) (finding that an
accused not incarcerated prior to trial is "still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living
under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often hostility").
112. DAC-IPAD REPORT, supra note 105, at 3.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 13.
115. Id. at 56.
116. Id.
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The DAC-IPAD determined that the prosecutorial assessment of
the sufficiency of the evidence is a significant factor predicting
conviction on a penetrative sexual offense charge. For example, the
committee found that 97.8% of cases resulting in conviction also had
sufficient admissible evidence to obtain and sustain a conviction.11 7
Moreover, the study revealed that the decision to refer to general
court-martial a sexual offense charge that lacked sufficient admissible
evidence to obtain a conviction directly contributed to the 61.3%
acquittal rate for these offenses.1 8 The DAC-IPAD's findings and
results from fiscal year 2017 are indicative of what could have been if
the military prosecution and convening authorities were guided and
equally bound by the following question of paramount importance: is
there sufficient admissible evidence to obtain and sustain a conviction at
trial?
Presently, the services' military justice officials concede that when
making their referral recommendations to general court-martial
convening authorities, they place equal or greater weight on other factors
aside from the sufficiency of the evidence, such as the victim's desire to
proceed to trial, community safety, and the accused's criminal history.' 19
The committee recognized that sexual assault cases are often "hard
cases" and determined that these hard cases "could and should proceed
to trial when there was sufficient evidence to support" a conviction.12 0 In
other words, the committee did not focus on whether a case was a
definite "winner" or if conviction was likely or even probable.12' The
committee also recognized that court-martial convening authorities feel
pressure to refer penetrative sexual offenses to trial because of the
statutory requirement of either a higher convening authority or the
Service Secretary, depending upon the circumstances, to review any
non-referral decisions. 2 As such, the DAC-IPAD's review of the 1904
adult penetrative sexual offense case files closed in fiscal year 2017
revealed a systemic problem with the referral of these charges where
there was insufficient admissible evidence to obtain and sustain a
conviction on the charged offense.1 23
117. Id. at 59. While it is a significant factor predicting conviction, the DAC-IPAD also found
that there was sufficient admissible evidence in 50.7% of cases resulting in acquittal on a
penetrative sexual offense charge. Id. The committee recognizes that not all cases with sufficient
admissible evidence will, in fact, result in a guilty verdict.

118. Id. at 6.
119. Id. at 57.
120. Id. at 59.
121. Id. at 57. The committee only "evaluated whether sufficient admissible evidence to obtain
a conviction was present in the investigative files, such that if the evidence was admitted at trial,
proof beyond a reasonable doubt was an achievable result." Id.
122. Id. at 63-64, 64 n.134; see also supra notes 16-18.
123. Id. at 64.
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As a result of this comprehensive study, the DAC-IPAD provided
one necessary and important recommendation to Congress:
Congress [should] amend Article 34, UCMJ, to require the staff judge
advocate to advise the convening authority in writing that there is
sufficient admissible evidence to obtain and sustain a conviction on a
charged offense before a convening authority may refer a charge and
24
its specification to trial by general court-martial.1

Similar to this Article's recommendations, the DAC-IPAD includes
legislative proposals for amending Article 34, UCMJ. In doing so, the
committee recommends modifications to Article 34, UCMJ (Advice to
convening authority before referral for trial), RCM 406 (Pretrial advice),
and RCM 601 (Referral).' These proposals would force military
prosecutors and convening authorities to evaluate the sufficiency of
admissible evidence before a case is brought to trial.
These legislative proposals should be adopted because the ethical
gap that exists in military prosecutions is a great detriment to all parties
involved-the victim, the accused, the unit, and the military justice
system at large. The DAC-IPAD's findings from its three-year project
6
examining the 2017 cases reveal the alarming impacts of such gap.12
Further, this ethical gap remains in stark contrast to all other criminal
justice practices in the United States. The military would be wise to
comport its prosecutorial ethics and professional responsibility standards
with its civilian counterparts to protect the credibility and fairness of the
military justice system.

124. Id. Further recommendations to Congress are included in Appendix E of this Report and
have been included in previous DAC-IPAD Reports. See Reports, DEF. ADVISORY COMM. ON
INVESTIGATION, PROSECUTION, AND DEF. OF SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE ARMED FORCES,

https://dacipad.whs.mil (last visited Nov. 7, 2020); see also supra Part V.
125. DAC-IPAD REPORT, supra note 105, at I-1; see also supra Part V.
126. DAC-IPAD REPORT, supra note 105, at 5 ("Taken together, these data raise issues of
grave concern regarding the fairness and integrity of the military justice system.").
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